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Motivation 
 Spatial distribution of agents and activities in a city affects: 
− Travel demand / energy consumption / pollution / social welfare 
 
 Cities are complex systems: 
− Interaction of different markets 
− Many heterogeneous agents 
− Externalities  
 
 Land use models allow to understand and forecast (?) the 
evolution of cities 
 
 Location choice models are a fundamental element of land use 
models 
 Microsimulation/agent-based models are flexible and detailed, 
making possible to evaluate complex scenarios 
 
Motivation  
Approaches to location choice modeling: 
− Choice: agents (households and firms) select location of 
maximum utility as price takers 
− Bid-auction: real estate goods are traded in auctions where 
prices and locations are determined by the best bidders 
 
Real estate markets: 
−  Quasi-unique good: all locations are different 
−  Inelastic demand: every agent needs to locate somewhere 
 
 Conflicts are solved through market clearing 
mechanisms 
 
Motivation  
Market clearing can be modeled by: 
 Solving an equilibrium problem 
− Aggregated 
− Strong assumptions (supply=demand) 
− Difficult to introduce dynamics 
 Simulating individual transactions  
− Computationally expensive 
− Data hungry 
 
 Method to simulate market clearing in location choice? 
Bid-auction approach to 
location choice 
Why bid-auction? 
 Real estate goods (housing, land) are quasi-unique and 
usually scarce  competition between agents 
 Explicit explanation of the price formation process (best 
bid in an auction) 
 Bid prices can be sensitive to scenarios of demand or 
supply surplus  
 Estimation: no price endogeneity 
 
 
Bid-auction approach to location choice 
 Bhi : willingness to pay of agent h for location i. 
 
 
 
xh :  characteristics of agent h (household, firm, …) 
zi :  attributes of location i (housing unit, parcel of land, …) 
 
 
 Probability of agent h being the best bidder for a location i 
(Ellickson, 1981): 
 
 
 
 H: set of bidding agents 
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Bid-auction approach to location choice 
 Price or rent for one location:  
− Deterministic: bid of the winner of the auction 
− Stochastic: expected maximum bid 
 
 
 ri : rent/price of i  (expected value of the maximum bid): 
 
 
 
  
H: set of bidding agents 
C: unknown constant 
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Estimation of bid function 
Bid function 
(Bhi) 
Observed locations 
(choices) 
Explanatory 
variables (xh , zi) 
(latent) auction 
prices (ri) 
Observed prices 
 (Ri) 
Standard Logit choice model 
Auction price  
measurement 
model 
Hurtubia and Bierlaire (2012). Estimation of bid functions for 
location choice and price modelling with a latent variable approach.  
Technical Report, TRANSP-OR 
 
http://transp-or.epfl.ch/  
Market clearing for agent-based  
bid-auction models 
Microsimulation with a bid approach  
 When bids are simulated we get: 
− Spatial distribution of agents 
− Real estate prices 
 
 But, in order to account for competition between 
agents for scarce goods, we need market clearing: 
 
− Through hedonic price models (UrbanSim) 
 Simple but not real market clearing 
 
− Individual auctions (ILUTE) 
 Expensive in computational terms, requires knowing 
choicesets 
 
− Equilibrium (MUSSA, RURBAN) 
 Aggregated approach 
 
 
The market clearing problem 
Joint probability of household h occupying location i: 
 
 
 
Maximum bid probability 
 
Maximum surplus (utility) probability 
 
Selling probability 
 
Locating probability 
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Re-visiting Equilibrium 
 In equilibrium models it’s usually assumed that 
supply (S) equals demand (H)  
 
 Possible equilibrium conditions: 
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(everything is sold) 
(everyone is located) 
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Re-visiting Equilibrium 
 Market clearing can be achieved by imposing one of 
the equilibrium conditions and finding prices/bids 
that produce them 
( ) ihiPr
h
i ∀=∃ ∑ 1|:
( ) hihPb
i
h ∀=∃ ∑ 1|:
(prices clear the market) 
(bids clear the market) 
Due to interdependence, these are usually fixed point problems 
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Re-visiting Equilibrium 
 If we have an auction market and the best bidder 
rule is observed, adjusting prices or bids is 
equivalent in equilibrium 
− Same spatial distribution of agents 
− Not necessarily same prices (rents or maximum bid) 
 Equilibrium implies: 
− aggregation of agents in groups  
− solving complex fixed point problems 
− Assuming that all agents re-locate 
 Idea: quasi-equilibrium: 
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Quasi-equilibrium  
 Periodical location of new and re-locating 
agents, given exogenous supply 
 Assumption: all households looking for a 
location are located somewhere  
− Total supply must be greater or equal than total 
demand 
− Not all locations are necessarily used 
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Quasi-equilibrium 
 No equilibrium   
− no perfect information (only aggregate supply 
level and previous prices are observed) 
− No iterative negotiation/bidding 
− No absolute adjustment of bids/prices 
 Instead, adjustment of “perception” of agents 
that goes in the direction of an equilibrium 
but does not solve it. 
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Quasi-equilibrium 
 Algorithm (in each period): 
− All agents       observe the market: prices and supply 
− All gents (simultaneously) adjust their bids, attempting to 
make their expected number of winning auctions equal to 
one: 
 
 
 
− All agents bid at the same time for all locations  prices and 
location distributions are defined 
− The assignment mechanism is an auction  for each location 
a best bidder and a price is determined 
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Quasi-equilibrium 
 Bid function:  
 
 Perceived (expected) location probability: 
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Advantage: no fixed point, just evaluation of equation  it is possible to apply to large populations 
without excessive computational cost 
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General framework for  
land use modeling 
General framework 
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Case study:  
Brussels 
Area of study 
Area of study  
Data 
 Data collected for a project financed by the European Union 
(SustainCity) 
− Census 2001 (aggregated information by zone) 
− Household survey 1999 (~1300 observations) 
− Average transaction prices by commune and 2 types of dwelling (house or 
apartment) from 1985 to 2008 
− Other geographical, land use databases 
 
 1267997 households, 1274701 dwellings 
 151 communes 
 4975 zones 
 4 types of dwelling (with average attributes per zone) 
− Isolated house 
− Semi-isolated house 
− Joint house 
− Apartment 
 
Bid function specification 
Bid function estimation results 
 Change in income distribution (2001-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
Results  
 Increase in prices (2001 -2008) 
Results 
 Evolution of prices (2001 – 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 A model for location choice is proposed. Adjustment 
of agent’s preferences goes (partially) in the direction 
of equilibrium market clearing 
 Results show the proposed model is able to forecast 
the price trend  
 Further work considers improving other components 
of the model and a comparison with UrbanSim 
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